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Introduction
The ‘problem-solving’ model of design as an
activity has become popular in recent years.
It has also been applied by educationists to
design as a pedagogic activity, and finds
expression in a number of publications.1  The
problem-solving model has a number of
attractions.
Firstly, problem-solving is presented as a
process. Therefore, if applied to design activity,
that activity itself is (so it appears) rendered
more transparent in terms of those processes.
The notion of ‘process’ of course also invites
one to consider the various elements involved.
Thus ‘design’, in being pictured as a process,
becomes a series of such elements, which
follow a sequence, which in turn can be
explicated. In this way, it seems that ‘design’
can be given a clear definition and explained,
laid out, and, as an activity, made transparent.
Secondly, it follows that if design can be
characterised in this way, then it becomes
amenable to pedagogic treatment; the very
notion of ‘process’ with its explicability in
terms of structure and order, suggests that
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pedagogic programmes may be developed
which aim at exhibiting this order. There is a
subtle and pervasive pressure at work here;
educators are usually seeking to promote
effective learning and, to that extent, are likely
to be attracted to the possibility of developing
systematising methods in pursuit of such aims.
This ‘process’ then becomes a vehicle for
‘learning’ in its own right. The ‘design process’
as an educational vehicle is thus born.
In what follows I will explore some of the
assumptions that tend to be associated with
the ‘problem solving’ approach to design and
technology education, by putting them to
begin with in the context of the broader
debate about ‘problem solving’ as a vehicle
for learning. I will then argue that this problem
solving model does little to promote our
deeper understanding of the actual ‘learning’
involved and that we should seek to augment
this model with one which may more
successfully capture our intuitions about the
educational value of the activity.
One of the main attractions of the ‘problem
solving’ approach, as currently conceived, is
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that it promises (or appears to promise) a
general strategy which can be applied in a
variety of differing contexts, and even differing
domains. In a world currently subjected to an
‘information explosion’, with knowledge
apparently proliferating at an exponential rate
and with attendant pressures on the
curriculum at all levels, the prospect of a ‘core’
of high level problem solving ‘thinking skills’
which can be taught in a systematic way and
which might then be employed to make this
vast sea of information and knowledge more
manageable is of course an attractive one.
The idea is not new by any means: it owes
much to Dewey2  going back to early in the
20th century and the assumptions it
incorporates about the nature of learning and
the acquisition of knowledge go back even
further to the early empiricists, particularly to
Locke3  , for whom all learning is rooted in
sensory particulars derived from immediate
experience of the world. This kind of
empiricist learning theory finds contemporary
expression in the approach of the situated
cognitivists, in locating all learning within
specific contexts containing a relevant
experiential component.4  However,
empiricism, at least in its strong form, with its
insistence that all knowledge is based on
particulars of experience, has difficulty in
explaining how learners ever actually acquire
general concepts, ie, how learners acquire the
powers of abstraction required in making the
apparent move from sensory particulars to the
concepts under which such particulars are
subsumed. Since such concepts are an integral
part of any knowledge system they have to be
accounted for; even a simple observation
report such as ‘the red rose is in the kitchen
garden’ already contains general terms (ie,
‘red’, ‘rose, ‘garden’ etc.). General terms are
built in to the very bedrock of our language
and learners master them as they acquire
language skills. If there are general terms in
our natural languages then ‘generalisability’
must, in some sense, be on the cards as a part
of our conceptual framework. I am not
concerned here to unravel these problems;
they are still very much a part of contemporary
debate about the nature of learning among
philosophers, psychologists and other
theorists. Rather, I wish to briefly draw
attention to key aspects of the ‘generalisability’
issue before offering an account of design
activity which I believe undercuts much of this
debate.
Thus I will note that the model incorporates a
generalisability thesis, which can take both a
stronger and a weaker form. The stronger
form makes the claim that problem solving
‘skills’ (along with other types of high level
thinking ‘skill’) can be isolated and acquired
(ie, taught) as skills in their own right apart
from any particular context. Examples of such
skills might be the ability(s) to extract relevant
information, to organise material, to analyse
data, to define a problem, structure the
problem domain and so forth.
Such ‘skills’ are typically seen as part of design
activity, or at least construed as a problem
solving process, and various models
incorporating them have become familiar in
the literature on design education.
The generalisability thesis has frequently been
attacked on logical grounds in that thinking
in any form presupposes some specific
domain or context and that therefore such
thinking ‘skills’ (including those of a ‘problem
solving’ variety) can only be articulated and
practised within some specific domain or
context. It has also been attacked on the
straightforwardly empirical grounds that there
is little (if any) evidence that learners are able
develop such skills in a context-free situation
(if indeed such a situation can be defined) . A
further line of attack argues that  the notion
of ‘skill’ as it is used here is in any case
mislocated. It is taken from contexts where it
is quite at home, and pressed into service in
contexts where it simply is not appropriate to
talk of the abilities under consideration as
‘skills’ at all. For example, although reading is
in some senses a skill, the ability to [say] read
with attention to appropriate detail, to extract
relevant information, to grasp new concepts
and to employ these in other contexts, has so
many subtle connections with personality,
attitude, motivation, to say nothing of the
learner’s prior competence or the specific
domain of employment and so on, that it is
doubtful whether their acquisition could be
linked with the development of skills in any
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straightforwardly intelligible way. Yet ‘study
skills’ programmes often do claim to be able
to develop these kinds of ‘skill’ and frequently
via the most ridiculously banal exercises.
The weaker form of the thesis concedes that
although the skills in question are context or
domain dependent as far as their elucidation
and development are concerned, once
mastered, they can be transferred to other
contexts and domains. We can refer to this as
the transferability thesis. This appears to have
greater plausibility, not least because at least
some problem solving strategies do have wide
application. Differential calculus (as an example
from the domain of mathematics) can be
applied to a wide range of engineering design
problems, and with considerable success. It is
of course, an algorithm, one of a large class of
algorithmic problem solvers. Indeed,
mathematics is a paradigm of such ‘problem
solving’ strategies, even providing us with a
putative example of ‘context free’ skills (ie,
‘pure’ maths). However, the plausibility of the
transferability thesis fades somewhat when we
note that such an example can be seen to fit in
at one end of a wide spectrum of strategies;
the very fact that it is an algorithm means that
it can be applied quite mechanically, for
example via a computer programme or some
other calculating device. We want to say that
‘problem solving skills’, whatever they amount
to in the context of design, consist not just in
the application of such algorithms, but rather,
in their intelligent (even creative) application.
And this clearly takes us beyond the domain of
the merely algorithmic; beyond, that is, the
mechanical application of a set of ‘rules’, no
matter how sophisticated their elucidation and
formulation might be.5
What we want to say here, is that problem
solving ‘ skills’ (in common with other high
level thinking skills) are not merely algorithmic
in character, but probably cover a broad
spectrum from the algorithmic through to the
kinds of application of ‘critical thinking’ leading
to insight, originality, and creativity in the
development of solutions to ‘ problems’. The
other end of this spectrum is often taken to
be just as problematic in that ‘creativity’ in
design (as in other areas) is thought to be
essentially mysterious6  and is in sharp contrast
to the kind of logical systematising
characteristic of algorithmic problem solving
methods.
The results of this discussion so far indicate
that the high level thinking ‘skills’ that we are
particularly interested in as far as design activity
is concerned, are, in some important as yet to
be elucidated sense, ‘creative’, requiring
intelligence and insight in their application.
What links the activities of ‘design’ and
‘learning’ is precisely those aspects of thinking
skills that most intrigue us here: intelligent
application, insight, creativity, innovation, and
so forth, are the very underpinning of the
conceptual growth we most associate with
significant learning. As educators we worry that
learners may simply apply ‘problem solving
processes’ mechanically without any insight or
real learning. We also tend to feel that to
attempt to apply these methods to the insight,
innovation and creativity implied in such high
level ‘problem solving skills’ as ‘organisation’,
‘analysis’, ‘definition’, ‘development’,
‘refinement’, ‘evaluation’ etc, is somehow
dangerously reductionist. We feel, (quite
rightly, I think) that such reductionism robs
design activity of its essential character.
Now I think there is a way out of the apparent
impasse here; but we need to step back from
the ‘problem solving’ model of designing and
look in a different direction. The search here
is for a way of describing, and reflecting on,
design, through a set of ‘criteria’ that can
provide us with a methodological framework
which will illuminate both design activity and
the products of design. In a discussion more
fully developed elsewhere 7  I have argued that
design activity can be characterised as a species
of ‘language’ consisting of a ‘vocabulary’,
having a grammar (syntax and semantics)
which although in a sense ‘rule-governed’
(including in some of its aspects the kind of
algorithmic ‘rules’ I’ve alluded to above),
nevertheless undergoes constant
metamorphosis and change, and that, if we
look carefully at the products of designers, we
can see this kind of metamorphosis in action.
What I want to bring out here is the
fundamentally metamorphic character of
design; and it is this metamorphism that aptly
enough characterises its ‘creative’ aspect. I
want to argue that the ‘creative’ (and not
merely the ‘problem solving’) aspect of design
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is amenable to analysis.
Indeed, design tends to be to thought of as a
quintessentially creative activity; and it is at this
point that we want to consider how the
language-games we play qua design, can, as it
were, acquire the kind of ‘new joint’ making it
possible to grasp a new vision, cast old
problems in a new light, glimpse new solutions,
or even see new problems. We need to capture
the sense in which the application of a rule (or
rules) can nevertheless lead to new insights,
new solutions to design issues; in short, to
growth in particular design language-games.
This, we feel, does not readily fit into the
reductionist methodology of the problem-
solving strategies we have been considering. As
an example of this more ‘creative’ aspect of
design activity at work, let us consider some of
Le Corbusier’s work. Writing in 1927, he argued
that:
The architects of today, lost in the sterile
backwaters of their plans, their foliage, their
pilasters and their lead roofs, have never
acquired the conception of primary masses.
They were never taught that at the Schools.
Not in pursuit of an architectural idea,
but simply guided by the results of
calculation [derived from principles
which govern our universe] and the
conception of a LIVING ORGANISM, the
ENGINEERS of today make use of the
primary elements, and, by co-ordinating
them in accordance with the rules,
provoke in us architectural emotions and
thus make the work of man ring in unison
with universal order. Thus we have the
American grain elevators and factories,
the magnificent FIRST FRUITS of the new
age. THE AMERICAN ENGINEERS
OVERWHELM WITH THEIR
CALCULATIONS OUR EXPIRING
ARCHITECTURE. [emphases in Le
Corbusier’s text] 8
In terms of our discussion, notice first that Le
Corbusier can be understood as claiming that
the language-games (e.g. of classicism) being
played by architects are headed for a dead end
(if not already in one); they lack, for example,
certain concepts, eg: a ‘conception of primary
masses’. Secondly, engineers are, on the other
hand, able to work with such a conception,
although not in any conscious conformity to
any ‘architectural idea; so here, he implies that
the growth of a design vocabulary does in some
sense require the acquisition of new concepts.
Thirdly, in suggesting that the work of the
engineers provokes ‘architectural emotions’,
he shows an intuitive grasp of the ways in
which such rules themselves are, at a deeper
level, amenable to other forms of
interpretation. Finally, he is not advocating the
application of new rules; rather, he seems to
be aiming at the different application of
existing ones. This does not require that we
attribute clairvoyant powers to Le Corbusier,
or suppose that he had- at this point in time-
grasped a whole new vocabulary of design in a
‘flash’. What he did see, was that the cluster of
language-games apposite to the engineering
disciplines had possible application in an
aesthetic domain. Thus, the rules of calculation
and measurement in engineering science,
which, as it were, impose particular structures
on form, themselves undergo a subtle
transformation in Le Corbusier’s vision. Here,
we might say, is direct evidence of the
evolution of a fertile new viewpoint in
architectural design; one where some of the
rules of engineering design become fused into
a creative adaption leading to the generation
of a new aesthetic - an aesthetic of the machine
- yielding a vocabulary of forms which was to
dominate much of 20th century architecture
and design
To take another example, this time from a
design historian; Reyner Banham, commenting
on automobile design in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, Banham draws attention to the
changes in a society where obsolescence was
rapidly becoming a major factor in product
design and development. In such a society, he
argues, aesthetic ideas were becoming as
expendable as the artefacts that reflected them.
Automobiles of the period exhibited this
vividly; Banham suggests that automobile
design stylists developed an iconography itself
derived from jet aircraft of the period, an
iconography which came to symbolise speed
and power (through) association with aircraft
technology) in the imagination of the public,
who could recognise and respond to this mode
of symbolisation, thus reinforcing it and
entrenching it more deeply in the popular
consciousness. By the ’50s and early ’60s we
can see extensions of this kind of design
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methodology; there are by then a multiplicity
of iconographies embedded in the popular
imagination with respect to automobiles,
ranging over not only iconographies of power
and speed, but wealth, sex, individualism,
freedom etc focused explicitly for example,
through sports cars such as the Jaguar ‘E’ type.9
Banham is not merely offering a description
here, but, rather, a commentary in the form
of an analysis. The value of such a commentary
is that it focuses our attention in a perspicuous
way; it offers an explicit viewing point. We have
an idea of ‘power’ (derived from the aircraft);
from this is developed a mode of
symbolisation; and we have a public which
‘reads’ this iconography  which becomes
reinforced and embedded in the popular
imagination. As technology moves on, so the
product disappears, taking with it the (equally
transient) particular iconographic reading
wherein lay its aesthetic appeal; the aesthetic
thus disappears into oblivion along with the
product.
By attending to actual examples of designers’
work and by studying the kind of commentary
offered by Banham, we can both illuminate,
and explicate, the’ processes’ of design thus
over- viewed. This kind of over-view offers
organisational constructs which enrich the
problem solving strategy by bringing out the
metamorphic, and evolutionary character of
designing. In attending to such commentaries,
students can learn, both to clarify their own
viewpoints, and also develop more sensitive
and informed responses to design work. It can
provide us with a conceptual ‘resource’ richer
than that of mere ‘problem-solving, and it
offers a much more vivid characterisation of
design activity.
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